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CHRISTINE TAYLOR1, YOH IWASA2, AND MARTIN A. NOWAK3
Abstract. In this paper, we show that for evolutionary dynamics between two types that
can be described by a Moran process, the conditional ﬁxation time of either type is the
same irrespective of the selective scenario. With frequency dependent selection between two
strategies A and B of an evolutionary game, regardless of whether A dominates B, A and
B are best replies to themselves, or A and B are best replies to each other, the conditional
ﬁxation times of a single A and a single B mutant are identical. This does not hold for
Wright-Fisher models, nor when the mutants start from multiple copies.
1. Introduction
A key aspect of evolutionary dynamics concerns the process where a new mutant is in-
troduced in a population. Through selection and random drift, the frequency of the mutant
changes, and sometimes the mutant can reach ﬁxation in the population (Fisher, 1922; Hal-
dane, 1927; Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1931, 1942; Kimura, 1957; Robertson, 1960; Kimura, 1994;
B¨ urger, 2000). The probability of ﬁxation and the mean time to ﬁxation of a single mutant
are important quantities. There is an extensive literature on this topic using diﬀusion theory
to calculate both the ﬁxation probability and the conditional mean time to ﬁxation (Kimura,
1994; Ewens, 2004).
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In particular, the conditional ﬁxation time of a single mutant is often a more relevant
measure of the evolutionary success of a mutant. Since the loss of a mutant gene is much
more frequent, the conditional ﬁxation time is much longer than the unconditional absorption
time until either ﬁxation or loss. (Nei & Roychoudhury, 1973; Maruyama, 1974, 1977)
noted, using diﬀusion theory, that under weak constant selection the mean ﬁxation time for
a favorable mutant is the same as that for the corresponding deleterious mutant in a Wright-
Fisher process. Diﬀusion methods can similarly show that in the setting of weak frequency
dependent selection involving two phenotypes engaged in a game, the mean ﬁxation time of
a single mutant of either phenotype is the same.
However, we show in this paper that, even under strong frequency dependent (including
constant) selection, the conditional ﬁxation time of a single mutant of either phenotype has
the same distribution, hence same mean, variance, etc, for a Moran process, though not for
a Wright-Fisher process. Our method is much simpler algebraically than the diﬀusion calcu-
lations of (Nei & Roychoudhury, 1973; Maruyama, 1974, 1977; Ewens, 2004); furthermore,
it requires no limiting assumption on population size or selection factor.
In Section 2, we focus on the the frequency dependent game dynamics of a Moran process
for ﬁnite populations proposed in (Nowak et al., 2004; Nowak & Sigmund, 2004; Taylor et al.,
2004). We state the surprising result that the time to ﬁxation of a single mutant, under weak
and strong selection, in a ﬁnite population, is independent of the strategies of the mutant
and the resident population. In other words, a single A mutant ﬁxates in a population of
B players as quickly as a single B mutant in a population of A players, regardless of the
strength of selection, or the fact that a single A mutant might be more likely to ﬁxate than a
single B mutant, or vice versa. Surprisingly this symmetry holds not only for the mean but
also for variance and all higher moments. We have learned that (Antal & Scheuring, 2006)
independently obtained the result that the two conditonal mean ﬁxation times are the same
in a particular game model of Moran process. The symmetry does not hold when the initial
number of mutants is greater than 1.
In Section 3, we note that this symmetry does not hold for models based on the Wright-
Fisher process.A SYMMETRY OF FIXATION TIMES IN EVOULTIONARY DYNAMICS 3
In Section 4, we generalize the symmetry of conditional ﬁxation times to a class of Markov
processes, where only states 1 and N − 1 can transition into absorbing states 0 and N
respectively. If the transition matrix further satisﬁes the detailed balance condition, then
the conditional ﬁxation time from state 1 to state N has the same distribution as that from
state N −1 to state 0. In particular, the two conditional ﬁxation times have the same mean
and the same variance and also all the moments.
Our result holds for games on cycles (Nakamaru et al., 1997, 1998; Nakamaru & Iwasa,
2005). Furthermore, our result also applies to a wide range of imitation processes of interest
to economists (Ellison, 1993; Binmore & Samuelson, 1997; Maruta, 2002), when the detailed
balance condition holds.
2. Fixation times in a Moran process
To illustrate the idea, we start with a frequency dependent Moran process as described in
(Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004). The payoﬀ matrix for a game with two strategies
A and B is given by Table 1.
We have a population of N individuals, each individual uses strategy either A or B. The
number of individuals using strategy A is given by i, and the ﬁtness of individuals using
strategy A and B are respectively fi and gi, where
(1) fi =1− w + w
a(i − 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1
,g i =1− w + w
ci + d(N − i − 1)
N − 1
.
w measures the strength of selection. The bigger w is, the stronger the selection.
The selection dynamics of this two strategy game with N players can be formulated as
a Moran process (Moran, 1962) with frequency dependent ﬁtness. At each time step, an
individual is chosen for reproduction proportional to its ﬁtness. One identical oﬀspring is
being produced which replaces another randomly chosen individual. Thus the population
size, N, is strictly constant. The probability of adding an A-oﬀspring is ifi/(ifi+(N −i)gi).
At each time step, the number of A individuals can either increase by one, stay the same,
or fall by one. Therefore, the transition matrix of the Markov process is tri-diagonal and
deﬁnes a birth-death process. The transition matrix is given by4 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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Pi,i+1 = λi =
ifi
ifi +( N − i)gi
N − i
N
Pi,i−1 = µi =
(N − i)gi
ifi +( N − i)gi
i
N
(2)
Pi,i =1 − Pi,i+1 − Pi,i−1,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ N. All other entries of the transition matrix are 0.
The probabilities, ρA, of a single A player to reach ﬁxation in a population of B players, and
ρB, of a single B player to reach ﬁxation in a population of A players are given respectively
by (Karlin & Taylor, 1975)
(3) ρA = π1 =
1
1+
PN−1
j=1
Qj
k=1
gk
fk
,ρ B = φN−1 =
1
1+
PN−1
j=1
QN−1
k=j
fk
gk
.
In general, we have ρA 6= ρB. However, we have
Proposition 1. The conditional mean ﬁxation time of a single A mutant, tA, is the same
as that of a single B mutant, tB, for all levels of selection and for all games.
In other words, even if an A player is more likely to ﬁxate in a population of B players,
than a B player in a population of A players, the conditional mean time for a single A player
to take over the whole population is the same as that for a single B player. The conditional
mean time to ﬁxation for a single mutant is the same irrespective of the direction of ﬂow or
the strength of selection, w.
In Figure 1(a), the x-axis measures w which ranges from 0 to 1, and the y-axis measures
the conditional mean ﬁxation time of a single mutant. We see that the conditional mean
ﬁxation times for a single A mutant and and a single B mutant are identical for all w and
for four diﬀerent games: a neutral game, a constant ﬁtness game where A is dominant, a
bi-stable game, and a Hawk-Dove game.
In fact, we shall show in Appendix A that the probability distributions of the conditional
time to ﬁxation for a single mutant of either type A or B are the same. Therefore, the mean,
variance, and all other moments of the two conditional ﬁxation times are the same.A SYMMETRY OF FIXATION TIMES IN EVOULTIONARY DYNAMICS 5
On the other hand, simulation shows that in general the conditional ﬁxation time of iA
mutants is not the same as that of iBmutants for weak or strong selection when i>1a s
explained later.
We calculate in Appendix B tA = tB for a Moran process under weak constant and
frequency dependent selection.
3. Fixation time in a Wright-Fisher process
In a Wright-Fisher process, at each time step, the entire population is replaced by a new
generation of the same size, its composition is determined by sampling with replacement
from the previous generation. If there are iAplayers before reprodution, the number of
A players after reproduction is a binomial random variable with index N and parameter
ifi/(ifi +( N − i)gi). The probability of having jAplayers afte reproduction is
(4) Pij =

 N
j


￿
ifi
ifi +( N − i)gi
￿j ￿
(N − i)gi
ifi +( N − i)gi
￿N−j
.
Under strong selection, the conditional ﬁxation time of a single A mutant is not the same
as that of a single B mutant. Figure 1(b) plots the conditional mean ﬁxation time of a single
mutant using strategy A or B for the same four games as in Figure 1(a). Again, the x-axis
measure the strength of selection w, and the y-axis measures the conditional mean ﬁxation
time. The solid lines plot the times for A mutant, and dashed lines for B mutant. For each
of the three non-neutral games, as w increases, the two conditional ﬁxation times for A and
B, and the corresponding solid and dashed lines, diverge further apart.
Under weak and constant selection, using diﬀusion theory (Nei & Roychoudhury, 1973;
Maruyama, 1974, 1977; Ewens, 2004) showed that a selectively disadvantageous mutant, if
destined for ﬁxation, spends as much time, on average, in any frequency range as a corre-
spondingly advantageous mutant destined for ﬁxation. In particular, the conditional mean
ﬁxation time of a single advantageous mutant is the same as that of a corresponding deleteri-
ous mutant. We can even generalize this symmetry result under weak selection to frequency6 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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depedent selection for Wright-Fisher model. Figure 1(b) shows that when w is small, the con-
ditional mean ﬁxation times of a single A mutant and a single B mutant are approximately
identical for four diﬀerent games.
4. Generalization
Moran and Wright-Fisher processes are two examples of a general Markov process on
states 0,1,2,...,N, with 0 and N being absorbing states. We have seen in Sections 2 and
3 that a single A mutant can reach ﬁxation equally fast as a single B mutant in a Moran
process irrespective of selection strength and game, while in a Wright-Fisher process, this
only holds when selection is weak.
We prove in Appendix A that
Proposition 2. For a Markov process P on 0,1,2,...,N state, where 0 and N are absorbing
states, suppose Pi0 =0for all i ≥ 2, and PjN =0for all j ≤ N −2; furthermore P satisﬁes
the detailed balanced condition, i.e. there exist a vector ~ ψ =( ψ1,...,ψ N−1), where all entries
are positive, such that
(5) Pijψi = Pjiψj
for 1 ≤ i,j ≤ N − 1, then the distribution functions of the conditional ﬁxation time from
state 1 to N and from state N − 1 to 0 are the same. In particular, the conditional ﬁxation
time from state 1 to N and from state N − 1 to 0 have the same mean and variance.
It shall be clear from the proof in Appendix A that there is only one state that can lead
to each of the absorbing states.
The principle of detailed balance is important in describing equilibrium properties. When
the detailed balance condition is satisﬁed, the equilibrium can be achieved in the sense
that around any closed circuit, the netﬂow is zero. In terms of the transition probabilities
of a Markov process, the detailed balance condition dictates that around any circulation,
the product of all the transition probabilities along the loop is the same and non-zero going
counterclockwise and clockwise. The detailed balance condition is also known as Kolmogorov
cycle condition, or Kolomogorov consistency condition.A SYMMETRY OF FIXATION TIMES IN EVOULTIONARY DYNAMICS 7
Obviously, if P is symmetric, it satisﬁes the detailed balance condition.
An important class of Markov processes which satisfy detailed balance condition is the
birth-death process, whose transition matrix P is a continuant, satisfying the condition that
Pij =0i f|i − j| > 1. In particular, for a Moran process discussed in Section 2, Proposition
1 follows immediately.
The principle of detailed balance is equivalent to the time reversal property for Markov
processes. For a Markov process M admitting a stationary distribution ~ Ψ=( ψ0,ψ 1,...,ψ N),
where the ψi’s are positive, M is reversible if and only if it satisﬁes the detailed balance
condition ψiMij = ψjMji for all i,j.
The Moran process, with selection as well as mutation is reversible, since there exists
a stationary distribution and it satisﬁes the detailed balance condition. In contrast, the
Wright-Fisher process with selection and mutation is not reversible, because it does not
satisfy the detailed balance condition. However, in diﬀusion approximation for a Wright-
Fisher process, Proposition 2 holds. Diﬀusion approximation is in eﬀect assuming weak
selection and a large population size. Proposition 2 does not hold for Wright-Fisher process
in general because it does not satisfy the detailed balance condition, nor does it satisfy the
property that only one state can transition into each of the two absorbing states.
It is important to note that for a Markov process satisfying the conditions of Propositoin
2, when i 6=1 ,N− 1, the distribution of conditional time to absorption from state i to N
is in general diﬀerent from the corresponding distribution from state N − i to state 0. This
will be illustrated by the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.
5. Discussions
We have shown in this paper that in a Moran process describing evolutionary dynamics
of two types, the conditional time to absorption for a single mutant of either type has the
same probability distribution, hence the same mean, variance and all other moments. This
is a consequence of the fact that the Moran process satisﬁes the detailed balance condition
on the intermediate states, whereby equilibrium is achieved. Our symmetry result does not8 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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hold for a Wright-Fisher process, except in the diﬀusion limit of weak selection and large
population.
Under the setting of a generalized Moran process, a single deleterious mutant succeeds
in taking over the population of more favorable wild-type individiduals as fast as a single
corresponding favorable mutant can take over a population of weaker wild-type individuals.
A deleterious mutant goes into extinction most of the time, but if it does succeed in
replacing the population, it spreads as fast as the corresponding single favorable mutant. In
contrast, while a single favorable mutant rarely goes to extinction, under strong selection, it
does not succeed any faster.
Our symmetry result of conditional mean ﬁxation time does not hold if the mutant starts
from multiple copies in both Moran and Wright-Fisher models. If a group of mutants is
introduced, then it is in general faster for the favorable mutants to succeed than for the cor-
responding deleterious mutants to succeed. Figure 2(a) shows the conditional mean ﬁxation
times of 2 A mutants and 2 B mutants for four diﬀerent games in a Moran process. The
two times are diﬀerent. The solid lines plot the time for A, and dashed lines for B. We see
that upon ﬁxation, the advantageous mutants ﬁxate faster than corresponding deleterious
mutants; both ﬁxate faster than 2 neutral mutants, except when the game is Hawk-Dove.
Figure 2(b) shows the conditional mean ﬁxation times of 2 A mutants and 2 B mutants for
four diﬀerent games in a Wright-Fisher process. Again the two ﬁxation times are diﬀerent,
and for very weak selection, the two ﬁxation times are close.
In fact, our results can also be applied to the study of evolutionary game dynamics on
graphs, of which there is a great deal of current interest (Nakamaru et al., 1997, 1998;
Nakamaru & Iwasa, 2005; Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006). In the case of a
cycle graph with N nodes, the game dynamics starting from a single mutant can be described
by the Moran process. State 0 is all B, and state N is all A; while state 1 corresponds to
the set of conﬁgurations where exactly one node plays A and the rest play B; and similarly
for state N − 1. Since the number of mutants can increase or decrease by at most 1 at
each time step, the corresponding Markov process is a birth-death process satisfying the
detailed balance condition. Hence, our result that the ﬁxation time of a single mutant ofA SYMMETRY OF FIXATION TIMES IN EVOULTIONARY DYNAMICS 9
either strategy is the same holds for games on a cycle. For higher dimesional torus type
graphs or lattices, where symmetric conditions guarantee that there is only a single state
that can transition into either of the two absorption states, we still need to make sure that
the detailed balance condition satiﬁes, in order to apply our result.
Since our results on the equality of ﬁxation time apply to the class of Markov processes
where the transition probabilities on the immediate states satisfy the detailed balance con-
dition, it would be interesting to ﬁnd examples of such Markov processes, other than the
Moran process, (e.g. lattices and higher dimensional torus with approproriate transition
matrix,) which satisfy this equilibrium condition.
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Appendix A. General results
Consider a general Markov process on states 0,1,2,...,N, where 0 and N are absorbing
states, and P is its transition matrix. Further, we add the constraint that Pi0 = 0 for all
i ≥ 2, and PjN = 0 for all j ≤ N −2. Hence, there is only one way in to the absorbing states
0 and N.
Notations:
• πi: the probability of reaching state N starting from state i.
• φi: the probability of reaching state 0 starting from state i.
• ui(t)=Prob{reaching state N starting from state i at time = t}.
• vi(t)=Prob{reaching state 0 starting from state i at time = t}.
• u∗
i(t)=Prob{reaching state N starting from state i at time = t
conditional upon ﬁxation} = ui(t)/πi.
• v∗
i(t)=Prob{reaching state 0 starting from state i at time = t
conditonal upon ﬁxation} = vi(t)/φi.
• ti: the unconditional mean time to reach either state 0 or N from state i.
• t∗
i: the mean time to reach state N from state i conditional upon ﬁxation at state N.
• s∗
i: the mean time to reach state 0 from state i conditional upon ﬁxation at state 0.
• tij: the mean sojourn time in state j before absorption into state 0 or N starting
from state i.12 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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• t∗
ij: the mean sojourn time in state j before absorption into state N starting from
state i conditional upon reaching state N.
• s∗
ij: the mean sojourn time in state j before absorption into state 0 starting from
state i conditional upon reaching state 0.
Let Trdenote transposition, deﬁne
~π =( π1,···,π N−1)
Tr, ~ φ =( φ1,···,φ N−1)
Tr,
~u (t)=( u1(t),···uN−1(t))
Tr,~ v (t)=( v1(t),···,v N−1(t))
Tr.
Clearly,
π0 =0 ,π N =1 ,φ 0 =1 ,φ N =0
t
∗
0 = ∞,t
∗
N =0 ,s
∗
0 =0 ,s
∗
N = ∞
From now on, we will work with the (N − 1) × (N − 1) submatrix of the original Markov
matrix P with its ﬁrst and last rows and columns removed, i.e. P is just the transition
matrix on states 1 through N − 1.
First, we ﬁnd that
(A.1) ~π =( I − P)
−1PN−1,NeN−1, ~ φ =( I − P)
−1P10e1,
where I is the (N − 1) × (N − 1) identity matrix.
It is important that P0i = 0 for i>1 and PN,j = 0 for j<N− 1 here and in the proof of
Proposition 2.
The matrix (I − P)−1 =
P∞
n=0 P n is called the fundamental matrix of the matrix P. The
mean waiting time, tij, in state j before absoprtion into state 0 or N starting from state i is
given by (I − P)
−1
ij and ti =
PN−1
j=1 tij.
The conditional waiting time in state j before absorption into state N starting from state
i, t∗
ij, is given by tijπj/πi.
We have
(A.2) u
∗
i(t)=
P
t−1
i,N−1
ti,N−1
,v
∗
i(t)=
P
t−1
i,1
ti,1
.A SYMMETRY OF FIXATION TIMES IN EVOULTIONARY DYNAMICS 13
Proof of Proposition 2: Let Ψ be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are given
by ψ1,ψ 2,...,ψ N−1. The detailed balanced condition is just
Ψ
−1PΨ=P
Tr
u
∗
1(t)=
P
t−1
1,N−1
t1,N−1
=
(P Tr)
t−1
N−1,1
(I − P Tr)
−1
N−1,1
=
(Ψ−1PΨ)
t−1
N−1,1
(I − Ψ−1PΨ)
−1
N−1,1
=
(Ψ−1P t−1Ψ)N−1,1
(Ψ−1(I − P)−1Ψ)N−1,1
=
P
t−1
N−1,1ψ
−1
N−1ψ1
tN−1,1ψ
−1
N−1ψ1
=
P
t−1
N−1,1
tN−1,1
= v
∗
N−1(t)
￿
Since
(A.3) t
∗
ij =
ti,jtj,N−1
ti,N−1
,s
∗
ij =
ti,jtj,1
ti,1
,
we can similarly show that
(A.4) t
∗
1j = s
∗
N−1,j
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, namely, the conditional mean sojourn time at state j starting from
state 1 and starting from state N − 1 are the same.
Since the distributions of conditional ﬁxation time are the same, i.e. u∗
1(t)=v∗
N−1(t), we
have that the conditional mean times to absorption from state 1 to N and from state N −1
to 0 are the same:
(A.5) t
∗
1 = s
∗
N−1 =
(I − P)
−2
1,N−1
t1,N−1
.
For a continuant matrix P, where Pij =0i f|i − j| > 1. Let Pi,i+1 = λi, and Pi,i−1 = µi,
λ0 = µN = 0. We can write down the expressions for t∗
1, s∗
N−1, t∗
1j, and s∗
N−1,j explicitly
[Karlin & Taylor, 1975; Ewens, 2004]. Let
ρj =
j Y
k=1
µk
λk
,ρ 0 =1
then
(A.6) t
∗
1j =
πj(1 − πj)
π1ρjλj
,s
∗
N−1,j =
πj(1 − πj)
π1ρj−1µj
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Using these formulae, we can calculate tA,t B in Appendix B.
It is important to note that for transition matrices satisfying the detailed balance condi-
tion,
(A.7) u
∗
i(t) 6= v
∗
N−i(t), 2 ≤ i ≤ N − 2.
in general. In particular, since
(A.8) t
∗
i =
(I − P)
−2
i,N−1
ti,N−1
,s
∗
N−i =
(I − P)
−2
N−i,1
tN−i,1
,
the conditional mean ﬁxation times
(A.9) t
∗
i 6= s
∗
N−i
in general.
Appendix B. Conditional mean fixation times for Moran process under
weak selection
In the special case of constant selection, where A has constant ﬁtness r =1+w>1, and
B has constant ﬁtness 1, we have ρA >ρ B. For weak selection (w< <1/N), we calculate
that
(B.1) tA = tB = N(N − 1)
￿
1 −
(N + 3)(N − 2)
72
w
2 + o(w
2)
￿
.
In particular, for large N,w eh a v e
tA = tB ' N
2
￿
1 −
N2w2
72
￿
.
Therefore, the ﬁxation time of a single mutant of either strategy is reduced by (N+3)(N−
2)w2/72 compared to the ﬁxation time of a neutral mutant. For r>1, one A player is more
likely to ﬁxate among B players than vice versa. We certainly expect that it would take
shorter time for A to ﬁxate than a neutral mutant. Moreover, a single B player also takes
the same shorter time span than a neutral mutant to ﬁxate in a population of A players,
although the relative ﬁtness of B is smaller than that of A.A SYMMETRY OF FIXATION TIMES IN EVOULTIONARY DYNAMICS 15
Under weak frequency dependent selection, we ﬁnd that
(B.2) tA = tB = N(N − 1)
￿
1+w
γN(N − 2)
36(N − 1)
+ o(w)
￿
,
where γ = b + c − a − d and δ = a − d +( d − b)N. For large N,w eh a v e
tA = tB ' N
2
￿
1+
γwN
36
￿
.
Hence even when strategy A dominates B, B ﬁxates in a population of A players equally
fast as A ﬁxates among B players. For bi-stable games, a>cand b<d , the ﬁxation time
for a single A or B player is shorter than that of a neutral mutant. For Hawk-Dove games,
a<cand b>d , the ﬁxation time is longer than that of a neutral mutant.16 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
1, YOH IWASA
2, AND MARTIN A. NOWAK
3
Table 1. Payoﬀ matrix for a game with two strategies A and B
AB
A ab
B cdA SYMMETRY OF FIXATION TIMES IN EVOULTIONARY DYNAMICS 17
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(a) Conditional mean ﬁxation time of a single mutant,
Moran Process
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Figure 1. Conditional mean ﬁxation time of a single mutant of strategy
A and B as a function of selection strenght w for diﬀerent payoﬀ matrices.
N = 5. Top ﬁgure: Moran process; the conditional mean ﬁxation times of a
single A mutant is the same as that of a single B mutant for all w. Bottom
ﬁgure: Wright-Fisher process; the conditional mean ﬁxation time of a single A
mutant (solid line) and that of a single B mutant (dashed line) are the same
for small w and diﬀerent for large w.18 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
1, YOH IWASA
2, AND MARTIN A. NOWAK
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Process
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Wright−Fisher process, N=5
a=b=c=d=1
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(b) Conditional mean ﬁxation time of 2 mutants, Wright-
Fisher Process
Figure 2. Conditional mean ﬁxation time of 2 mutants of strategy A and B
as a function of selection strenght w for diﬀerent payoﬀ matrices. N = 5. Top
ﬁgure: Moran process; the conditional mean ﬁxation times of 2 A mutants
(solid line) and that of 2 B mutants (dashed line) are diﬀerent for all w 6=0 .
Bottom ﬁgure: Wright-Fisher process; the conditional mean ﬁxation time of
2 A mutants (solid line) and that of 2 B mutants (dashed line) are diﬀerent,
however they are very close for small w.